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Introduction 
What is it about computer and information technology, as opposed to 
bicycles or toasters or light bulbs, that creates ethical issues and 
uncertainty about right and wrong, good and bad? This question and a 
set of related issues have been a matter of debate among computer 
ethicists. The controversy has focused especially on whether the 
ethical issues surrounding computer technology are unique. Are the 
issues really different in the sense that they require development of a 
"new ethics"? Or are computer-ethical issues simply old ethical issues 
in a new guise? 
The uniqueness issue is intertwined with several other important and 
persistent questions. A single account of computer ethics might, for 
example, explain both why/how computer technology gives rise to 
ethical issues as well as show how the issues are unique. An answer 
to the uniqueness question might also answer the question whether a 
new field of study is needed to deal with computer-ethical issues. If the 
issues are unique, then a new field needs to be developed and new 
courses offered; if the issues are not unique, then, perhaps, they are 
better dealt with as part of philosophical ethics and in standard ethics 
courses. Moreover, the uniqueness issue seems tied to the question 
of methodology. What does the field of computer ethics involve in the 
sense of an activity or methodology? That is, what does one "do" 
when one does computer ethics? The answer to this question would 
be clearer if we understood what is special or unique about computer-
ethical issues. 
New Possibilities and a Vacuum of Policies 
While it is true that bicycles, toasters, and light bulbs do not seem to 
pose ethical issues, computer technology is not the first (nor will it be 
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the last) technology to raise moral concerns. Think of the ethical 
questions now raised in science about the Human Genome Project 
and about cloning. Or think of the atom bomb and nuclear power. New 
technologies seem to pose ethical issues when they create new 
possibilities for human action, both individual action and collective or 
institutional behavior. Should I donate my organs for transplantation? 
Should employers be allowed to use urine or blood tests to determine 
if employees are using drugs? Should we build intelligent highways 
(recording automobile license plates to document when cars enter 
and leave the highway, calculate speed, and charge tolls)? Should we 
use or ban biological weapons? 
As these examples suggest, the new possibilities created by 
technology are not always good. Often they have a mixed value. There 
are social and individual benefits but there are also new risks and 
costs. 
Because new technological possibilities are not always good or 
purely good, they need to be evaluated – morally as well as in other 
ways, e.g. economically or environmentally. Evaluation is not just a 
matter of determining whether to accept and use or reject a 
technology. Evaluation can and should take place at each stage of a 
technology’s development, and can and should result in shaping the 
technology so that its potential for good is better realized whilst 
negative effects are eliminated or minimized. Of course, technical 
possibilities are sometimes rejected after evaluation, as in the case of 
biological weapons, nuclear power (no new nuclear power plant has 
been built in the U.S. for several decades, for example), and various 
chemicals that deplete the ozone or cause other types of 
environmental degradation. 
Computer and information technology is not unusual is this respect. It 
has created amazing possibilities for individual and institutional 
behavior. We could not have reached the moon without computers, 
nor could we have the kind of global communication systems we now 
have. Information technology used in medicine has enormously 
enhanced our ability to detect, diagnose, and treat illness. Information 
technology has created thriving new industries and facilitated a 
growing global economy. Nevertheless, computer and information 
technology creates potentially undesirable as well as desirable 
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possibilities. We now have a greater capacity to track and monitor 
individuals (without their knowledge), to develop more heinous 
weapon systems, and to eliminate the need for human contact in many 
activities. The possibilities created by information technology, like 
other technologies, need to be evaluated morally and in other ways. 
Extending the idea that computer technology creates new 
possibilities, in a seminal article, Moor [1985] suggested that we think 
of the ethical questions surrounding computer and information 
technology as policy vacuums. Computer and information technology 
creates innumerable opportunities. This means that we are confronted 
with choices about whether and how to pursue these opportunities, 
and we find a vacuum of policies on how to make these choices. The 
central task of computer ethics, Moor argues, is to determine what we 
should do and what the policies should be. This includes 
consideration of "both personal and social policies". 
The sense in which there is a vacuum of policies surrounding 
computer technology can be illustrated, first, with examples from the 
early days of the technology. Consider the lack of rules regarding 
access to electronically stored data when computers were first 
developed. Initially, there were no formal policies or laws prohibiting 
access to information stored on a mainframe computer. From our 
perspective today, it may seem obvious that computer files should be 
treated as private; however, since most early computing took place in 
business, government, or educational institutions, the privacy of files 
was not so obvious. Or, consider the lack of policies about the 
ownership of software when the first software was being written. It was 
not clear whether software should be un-ownable or considered 
private property. These vacuums have now been filled: laws have 
been created; personal and institutional policies have been 
developed; and conventional practices have taken hold, specifying 
how individuals and organizations should behave when it comes to the 
privacy of computer files and ownership of software. 
Nevertheless, computer technology has been far from stagnant since 
those early days, and with each new innovation or application, new 
policy vacuums have arisen. Is it ethical for a company with a website 
to place a cookie on the hard drive of those who visit their site? Is 
data mining morally acceptable? Are Internet domain names being 
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distributed in a fair way? Should surgery be performed remotely with 
medical imaging technology? Should computer graphical recreations 
of incidents, such as automobile accidents, be allowed to be used in 
courtrooms? Is it right for an individual to reproduce and alter an 
artistic image electronically that was originally created by someone 
else? New innovations, and the ethical questions surrounding them, 
continue to arise with a pace with which it is difficult to keep up. Policy 
vacuums continue to arise and they are not always so easy to fill. 
The Traditionalist Account 
How policy vacuums are filled is, at least partly, a matter of 
methodology. How can or should computer-ethical issues be 
resolved? On one account – call this the traditional account – all that 
is necessary is to take traditional moral norms and the principles on 
which they are based, and apply them to the new situations created by 
computer and information technology. For example, when it came to 
filling the policy vacuum with regard to ownership of computer 
software, lawyers, judges and policy makers essentially extended 
existent property law to the new "thing", computer software. Or, to use 
a more current example, when it comes to on-line communication, we 
should look at the conventions that are followed in face-to-face, 
telephone, and written communication and "map" these conventions 
onto computer mediated communication. Certain words and 
questions are considered impolite; certain kinds of conversations are 
considered confidential; etc. According to the traditionalist account, 
we should take these conventions and simply create similar, parallel 
conventions regarding computer-mediated communication. 
The traditionalist account is important both as a descriptive and as a 
normative account. That is, it both describes how policy decisions are 
often made, and, normatively, recommends that this is how policy 
vacuums ought to be filled. Descriptively, the account captures what 
people often do when they are getting used to computer and 
information technology. For example, we may approach computer-
mediated communication or ownership of software with certain 
preconceptions and then use these to decide what to do. As I 
compose e-mail, I imagine myself writing a letter and use the format 
and language of letter writing, or I imagine myself having a phone 
conversation and compose appropriately. When I hear of someone 
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accessing my computer files, I think of the parallel with someone 
breaking into my house or office, and it seems clear that they have 
violated my property rights. Thus, the traditionalist account captures 
the idea that when we develop policies with regard to computer and 
information technology, we tend to draw on familiar social and moral 
ideas, extending them to fit whatever new features we encounter in the 
new technology. 
Normatively, the traditionalist account appropriately recommends that 
we should do this for it involves making use of past experience. We 
already know, for example, a lot about property rights and what sorts 
of issues are likely to arise; we already know that certain words will 
offend others and that individuals have an interest in some 
conversations being kept confidential. It makes good sense to draw 
on these experiences when it comes to a new situation, be it one 
created by computer technology or something else. So, the 
traditionalist account seems to capture much of what is involved in 
filling policy vacuums surrounding computer and information 
technology. 
However, the traditionalist account over-simplifies the task of 
computer ethics. It suggests a somewhat mechanical process of 
extending what is already known and accepted to what is unknown. It 
hides many of the important decision points in resolving computer-
ethical issues. The process is much more fluid and synthetic. For one 
thing, conceptual muddles have to be cleared up and different 
conceptualizations compete for use. Moor [1985] pointed to the 
problems of conceptual muddles early in the field’s development. If we 
do not know what we are dealing with, we do not know which rules or 
principles should be applied (Moor [1985]). Is sending an email 
message more like sending a postcard than having a phone 
conversation or sending a letter? The privacy conditions we come to 
think appropriate for email depend on which way we categorize and 
conceptualize it. 
The best illustration of this is the case of computer software programs. 
A complex body of law regarding ownership of new inventions already 
existed long before computers, including patent law, copyright, and 
trade secrecy. Applying this law to computer software turned out to be 
enormously difficult because nothing with the characteristics of 
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software programs had ever existed before, and so it was unclear 
how software programs should be conceptualized or categorized. Is a 
program the kind of thing that should be treated as property? Is a 
program the expression of an idea? If so, it would be a form of 
intellectual property for which copyright law is appropriate? Or, is it 
(should it be seen as) a process for changing the internal structure of 
a computer? Or perhaps, a program should be seen as a series of 
"mental steps", capable, in principle, of being thought through by a 
human, and not, thereby, appropriate for ownership? 
This is not to say that traditional legal or moral norms were irrelevant 
to the policy vacuum surrounding computer programs. On the contrary, 
there was a need to clear up the conceptual muddle in part so that the 
new entity could be seen in relation to familiar legal and moral norms. 
The important thing to recognize is that deciding whether computer 
programs are expressions of ideas or mental steps or machine 
designs was not an issue with a predetermined right answer. Policy 
makers, in a sense, made computer software what it is by deciding 
how to treat it legally. Deciding that copyright applied, defined 
software. Later deciding that patent law applied to certain types of 
software also defined it. 
The Internet also illustrates how conceptual muddles prevent the 
mechanical application of traditional norms. Writers have had a good 
deal of fun trying to conceptualize the Internet. Some (including Al 
Gore) have conceptualized it as a network of highways, the 
superhighways of the future. Others have thought of it as a huge 
shopping mall with an almost infinite number of possible stores and 
one navigates one’s way through the mall finding some places one 
does not want to go. Yet others have likened the Internet to 
Disneyland, suggesting that what one finds on the Internet should 
always be treated as a fantasy. These analogical renderings of the 
Internet are attempts to conceptualize it in a way that will help to fill in a 
wide range of policy vacuums. For example, when a website puts a 
cookie on your hard drive, how should this activity be understood? Is it 
intrusive surveillance? Or routine business? Are cookies comparable 
to a store (in a shopping mall) asking for your zip code when you buy 
something, so that it can do marketing analysis and determine in what 
neighborhoods to advertise? (Of course, with cookies, you do not 
 7 
have a choice to tell or not to tell.) Or is it more like installing a camera 
in a store to watch and see every customer that enters? (Of course, 
the website cannot actually tell who you are the way a camera can.) Or 
is going from one website to the next more like traveling on a highway, 
in which case cookies seem more like a surveillance technology? We 
have to clarify what is involved in the activity in order to know what 
norms are appropriate. Needless to say, how we understand the 
activity makes all the difference in our evaluation of it. 
Conceptual muddles partly explain why policy vacuums cannot 
mechanically be filled with already known moral and legal rules or 
principles. Another problem is normative. If we always map the way 
we currently do things onto the new technology, we risk missing 
opportunities to create better policies and a better world. If we were 
always to treat new situations as if they were comparable to known 
and familiar situations, then we would never allow for the new features 
of technology to have an effect. To treat computer-ethical situations 
(policy vacuums) as if they can always be resolved by traditional moral 
norms is, in a sense, to presume that there is never anything new. It is 
also to presume that we currently have an ideal moral world. 
The new features and new possibilities of computer and information 
technology create opportunities for new and better arrangements 
(relationships, institutions, capabilities). Policy decisions are 
opportunities to make the world better and if we only map old patterns 
and arrangements onto the new technology, then we fail to learn from 
past mistakes or take advantage of new possibilities. So, for 
example, when it comes to universal access to the Internet, instead of 
following practices and policies that were used in moving towards 
universal access in telephone service, we should consider what 
worked as well as what did not work, before moving policies from one 
domain to the other. In the early days of computing, many in the 
computing community saw the potential of software to be readily 
available to everyone, since multiple copies can be made without loss 
to the holder of the original. They saw in software a potential that had 
never quite existed in other forms of property. The debate about 
ownership was, in a sense, a debate about taking advantage of the 
special features of software to create something different than ever 
before. 
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So, while the traditionalist account captures part of what is and should 
be done in resolving computer-ethical issues (filling policy vacuums), it 
does not capture all that is involved and has the danger of hiding many 
of the important aspects of the process. Filling policy vacuums is not a 
matter of simply and mechanically applying traditional legal and moral 
principles. Conceptual muddles have to be cleared up and clearing up 
the conceptual muddles is often where normative decisions are 
invisibly made. Policy vacuums should be filled in a way that takes 
advantage of the new features of the technology. 
Are Computer Ethical Issues Unique? A Deeper Analysis 
New Species of Traditional Moral Issues 
I propose that we think of the ethical issues surrounding computer and 
information technology as new species of traditional moral issues. On 
this account the idea is that computer-ethical issues can be classified 
into traditional ethical categories. They always involve familiar moral 
ideas such as personal privacy, harm, taking responsibility for the 
consequences of one’s action, putting people at risk, and so on. On 
the other hand, the presence of computer technology often means that 
the issues arises with a new twist, a new feature, a new possibility. 
The new feature makes it difficult to draw on traditional moral 
concepts and norms. 
Once again the ownership of computer programs in the early days of 
computing illustrates the point. Issues of ownership and property had, 
of course, been around for centuries, long before the advent of 
computer technology. But never before computer technology had a 
property rights issue arisen with the cluster of characteristics 
(especially the reproducibility) of computer software. More to the 
point, before computers, it was inconceivable that a sequence of 
steps translated into ones and zeros could have value. So, the issues 
of ownership surrounding computer software are unique in the sense 
that they involve ownership of something that had never been a 
candidate for ownership before. And insofar as software has unique 
power and unique features, the ownership issues are unique. The 
issues of ownership surrounding computer software are, in this sense, 
an unusual species of familiar ethical and legal problems. Human 
beings want (in a capitalist economy) to own and control that which 
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has value, that from which they can profit. Computer programs have 
such value. The only mystery, the only thing new is that software has 
some features that are distinct from other things that have been 
defined as property. Software has features which make it difficult (as 
discussed earlier) to apply current law mechanically. Whether and how 
various aspects of computer software should be owned are new 
species of familiar moral issues. 
The genus-species account emphasizes the idea that the ethical 
issues surrounding computer technology are first and foremost ethical. 
This is the best way to understand computer-ethical issues because 
ethical issues are always about human beings. Ethical issues are 
always about human interactions, human interests, human harm and 
well-being, and conflicts between human beings. An ethical issue 
arises when something that humans value is at stake. It may be 
something as profound as a right to life or a right to be treated fairly. 
Or it may be something as complicated as assigning liability in a way 
that will have good consequences. Or it may be a matter of deciding 
what the rules should be when it does not make a great difference 
whether it is rule A or B as long as there is a rule, e.g. which side of 
the road automobiles go. 
The fact that computer-ethical issues can be thought of as ethical 
issues in the traditional sense should not surprise us, for we would not 
be able to recognize them as ethical issues unless they connected in 
some way or another to our traditional moral notions. Imagine 
creatures from outer space looking somewhat similar to human 
beings suddenly appearing; they walk and talk like us, but every once 
in awhile they behave in strange ways. How would we think about this 
behavior? We would have no basis for claiming that it was immoral 
except if the behavior had characteristics that violated or conformed 
to our moral norms. If, for example, the behavior resulted in the death 
of a human or if the behavior could be described as lying, then we 
would be inclined to call it immoral or bad. This may seem a far-
fetched idea but it becomes more plausible when one remembers (as 
discussed earlier) that computer and information technology give 
human beings the capacity to do things they could not do before: 
visiting a Web site, launching a virus, anonymously engaging in role 
playing games with people thousands of miles away. 
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Instrumentation of Human Action 
Computer and information technology changes the instrumentation of 
human action. The physical events that occur when an action takes 
place in a computerized environment are different from those that 
occur when the same type of action takes place without a computer. 
When I write a paper by hand, pencil moves over paper. When I use a 
typewriter, levers and gears move. When I use a computer, electronic 
impulses change configurations in microchips. Now, in this example, 
the changes in physical events that take place when I write seem 
morally insignificant. In all three cases, I create words and a text. 
However, there are many cases in which the switch from no 
technology to technology or from one technology to another changes 
not just the physical events constituting an act, but the moral character 
of the situation. 
As explained earlier, often what changes is the possibilities for action. 
A good example here is the act of launching a computer virus. 
Computer technology and the Internet have made it possible for an 
individual sitting alone in a room, to move their fingers over a 
keyboard, pressing various keys, and with these simple movements, 
launch a virus that wreaks havoc in the lives of thousands of people. 
The technology has instrumented an action not possible (indeed, not 
even comprehensible) without it. 
A world instrumented with computer technology has very different 
possibilities for human action than a world without computer 
technology. Consider other illustrations. When a business automates 
its workplace, it acquires the ability to create and manipulate data in a 
way that would have been (practically) impossible before. In the new 
environment, employees who perform routine tasks also create 
records of their activities. When customers make purchases from an 
automated business, they no longer simply give money in exchange 
for a product; they simultaneously create an enduring record of their 
transaction, a record that can be combined with other records to 
create a profile of the customer. Hence, the act of purchasing 
something is a very different act in a computerized environment as 
compared to a non-computerized environment. Similarly, when 
speaking face to face, the default situation is that spoken words 
disappear after they are spoken (except insofar as they remain in the 
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memory of those who have heard them). On the other hand, in saying 
precisely the same thing to the same person in an e-mail exchange, 
the default position is that the words endure. Effort has to be made to 
remove the words from the system. So, actions or action-types are 
instrumented very differently in computerized and non-computerized 
environments and the difference in instrumentation often has moral 
significance. 
In some cases, computerization adds features to the situation; in 
others cases, it seems more accurate to say that certain features of 
action are enhanced or constrained. For example, in the business 
transactions mentioned earlier, even without computer technology, a 
company could have created and retained records of all their sales or 
they could set up cameras that record every movement their 
employees make. To do so would have been difficult and costly but 
would, nevertheless, have been possible. Computerization facilitates 
the capacity for recording and maintaining the records of transactions 
and activities; it makes the recording instantaneous and effortless. 
So, in this case, it may be more accurate to say that a possibility has 
been facilitated or enhanced rather than created. Similarly, we have 
always had the ability to communicate with colleagues in other 
countries, via mail or expensive telephone calls. The Internet did not 
create a new possibility; rather, it enhanced and facilitated the 
possibility of international communication by making it easier, quicker, 
and cheaper. 
So, computer technology creates a new instrumentation for human 
action, both for individual action and for institutional arrangements. 
The new instrumentation changes the composition of action and it 
creates the possibility of actions and arrangements that were not 
possible before. It also facilitates and constrains actions or 
arrangements that were possible before. 
Ethical analysis has not traditionally or explicitly focused on the 
instrumentation of action. Rather, ethicists have emphasized ethical 
theory, assuming that theories can do the job of explaining what 
individuals ought to do in a wide range of (if not all) situations. 
Nevertheless, ethical analysis always presupposes an instrumentation 
of action. That is, ethical analysis always presupposes a physical 
world of a particular kind and human bodies with particular features. 
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Computer-ethical issues draw attention to this, largely ignored aspect 
of ethics. 
The character of the physical world in which humans act has 
continuously changed over time, largely due to technological change. 
One could argue, then, that computer and information technology is 
just another step in a series of ongoing changes that have altered the 
instrumentation of human action. Electricity, airplanes, guns, and 
bombs have all changed what human beings can do with movements 
of their bodies. These technologies have all changed the configuration 
of the physical world in which human beings act and live. They have all 
made it possible for human beings to perform actions not possible 
before (without) a given technology—firing guns, flying, giving and 
receiving organs, dropping bombs, cloning. And they have all 
facilitated and burdened various aspects of human action. 
The new possibilities and/or newly favored and disfavored features 
give rise to ethical issues because traditional moral concepts and 
norms presupposed a world instrumented in a different way. The new 
instrumentation gives rise to new species of generic moral issues. 
This account of computer-ethical issues as new species of generic 
moral problems is meta-ethical. It is about how ethical issues are 
identified, classified, and then addressed. On this model, new issues 
can arise and do arise when new circumstances of human action 
arise. Of course, it is important to point out that to say that computer-
ethical issues are new species of generic moral problems does not 
mean that new species always fit neatly into old categories or that our 
categories never change. New species do sometimes challenge the 
traditional categories or straddle several categories. Computer and 
information technology does sometimes instrument human action in 
ways that seem to challenge our ordinary categories. 
So, the ethical issues surrounding computers are not new in the sense 
that we have to create new ethical theories or systems. Instead, 
computer-ethical issues call upon us to come to grips with new 
species. This is entirely consistent with resolving computer-ethical 
issues both by drawing on experience with non-computerized 
environments and making allowances for the special or new features 
of the technology. New species have special features, but we can and 
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should draw on our traditional moral principles and theories. 
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